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Implementing Privacy Policy: Who
Should Do What?
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic*
Academic scholarship on privacy has focused on the
substantive rules and policies governing the protection of personal
data. An extensive literature has debated alternative approaches
for defining how private and public institutions can collect and use
information about individuals. But, the attention given to the what
of U.S. privacy regulation has overshadowed consideration of how
and by whom privacy policy should be formulated and
implemented.
U.S. privacy policy is an amalgam of activity by a myriad of
federal, state, and local government agencies. But, the quality of
substantive privacy law depends greatly on which agency or
agencies are running the show. Unfortunately, such
implementation-related matters have been discounted or ignored—
with the clear implication that they only need to be addressed after
the “real” work of developing substantive privacy rules is
completed.
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As things stand, the development and implementation of U.S.
privacy policy is compromised by the murky allocation of
responsibilities and authority among federal, state, and local
governmental entities—compounded by the inevitable tensions
associated with the large number of entities that are active in this
regulatory space. These deficiencies have had major adverse
consequences, both domestically and internationally. Without
substantial upgrades of institutions and infrastructure, privacy law
and policy will continue to fall short of what it could (and should)
achieve.
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“The world’s most valuable resource is no longer
oil, but data.”1
“In the ‘20s and ‘30s it was the role of government.
‘50s and ‘60s it was civil rights.
The next two decades are going to be privacy.”2

INTRODUCTION
For the past few decades, academics, government officials, and
practitioners have debated the merits of privacy law and policy.3
Most of the debate has focused on the substantive rules and
policies that dictate how private and public institutions can collect
and use information about individuals. Various commentators have
offered frameworks, templates, and design principles for
developing an optimal set of privacy rules.4 The most popular
approach appears to be codifying and extending existing
substantive law by adopting an omnibus federal privacy statute—
although there is considerable disagreement on the details of what
such a statute should include.5

1

The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May
6, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demandsnew-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource
[https://perma.cc/52PK9LGL].
2
The West Wing: The Short List (NBC television broadcast Nov. 24, 1999).
3
The legal systems that control the collection and use of information about
individuals are sometimes called privacy law and sometimes called data protection. In
this paper, we use the term “privacy” to encompass both ideas. See Woodrow Hartzog &
Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 2230, 2235 (2015). We define what we mean by privacy law and the institutions
that carry out privacy functions below. See discussion infra Part II.
4
See generally Dan Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 352; ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES:
A BASIC HISTORY (2017), https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V2YV-8DE3].
5
See, e.g., Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework For
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, WHITE
HOUSE (2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D68Q-VHCT].
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This emphasis on policy substance has overshadowed issues of
administrative implementation—a problem that is certainly not
unique to privacy policy.6 That said, even casual observers of the
U.S. system know that a bewildering assortment of federal, state,
and local governmental entities are active in the privacy policy
space. The hodgepodge of involved institutions deserves close
attention, for the quality of substantive privacy policy depends
greatly on which agency (or agencies) run the show.
In the past fifteen years or so, academics, government officials,
and practitioners have devoted more attention to implementation
issues.7 Some scholars have examined how the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) has become the closest U.S. equivalent to a
national privacy authority—a status owing both to historical
accident and to the FTC’s conscious efforts to occupy a significant
un-colonized policy space.8 Others have considered how the
6

On the gap between the adoption of policy reforms and their successful sustained
implementation, see ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER
MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 155 (2008) (“[W]hat is required to initiate policy
reform should not be confused with what is required to sustain it.”) (emphasis in
original); GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 267–68 (1971) (“If analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve
desired policy outcomes . . . we shall have to find ways of thinking harder about the
problem of ‘implementation,’ that is, the path between the preferred solution and actual
performance of the government.”). See also David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic,
Competition Agencies with Complex Portfolios: Divide or Conquer?, CONCURRENCES
REV. NO. 1-2013, ART NO. 50967, 1-2 (2013), https://www.concurrences.com
/en/review/issues/no-1-2013/conferences/competition-agencies-with-complex-policyportfolios-divide-or-conquer-chicago (“The specific amalgamation of policy tasks within
a single government body has important consequences for how competition agencies
define their goals, allocate resources, and select programs to fulfill their duties. The
assignment of multiple regulatory tasks can deeply affect a competition agency’s
performance, just as it affects the performance of other agencies. This issue has attracted
little attention in competition policy circles, although public administration scholars (and,
to a far more limited extent, legal academics) have done important work on such issues in
other areas.”).
7
See, e.g., Symposium, Enforcing Privacy Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (2003)
(collecting various papers on privacy policy implementation). Commentators before this
period expressed concern with the adequacy of implementing institutions for privacy
policy. But, our perception is that the attention to implementation has increased
significantly in the more recent era.
8
See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 26–35 (2016); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2232; see generally Daniel J.
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
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development and enforcement of privacy policy should be
allocated among federal agencies and across state governments.9
Another line of commentary has compared U.S. privacy
institutions to their counterparts abroad.10
In this paper, we build upon these contributions, and consider
the optimal agency design with which to form and implement U.S.
privacy policy. Despite important achievements, the existing
configuration of implementing institutions leaves much to be
desired. Authority over privacy is simultaneously murky and
subdivided among multiple entities at the federal (i.e., the FTC and
sector specific regulators), state, and local levels. The resulting
dynamics (both horizontal and vertical) create considerable interagency tension and inconsistency.
In our experience at the FTC and working in Europe, we have
seen that these institutional deficiencies have at least two distinct
adverse consequences. First, the institutional status quo
undermines the ability of the United States to develop coherent
substantive privacy policy. Outwardly, the many public bodies at
the national and state levels with privacy-related duties profess a
common commitment to work collegially toward the development
of sound privacy policies. To some extent, the expressed spirit of
common cause is genuine, and it routinely manifests itself in
helpful forms of policy coordination and enforcement cooperation.
At the same time, in our roles inside and outside the government,
we have observed a distressing tendency of participants to seek
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). See also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data
and the Future for Privacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATIONS 21 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016) (noting the
FTC’s “entrepreneurial expansion of its jurisdiction” regarding privacy).
9
See generally Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys
General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016); Peter Swire, Why the Federal Government
Should Have a Privacy Policy Office, 10 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41 (2012)
[hereinafter Swire, Privacy Policy Office]; Peter Swire, No Cop on the Beat:
Underenforcement in E-Commerce and Cybercrime, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
107 (2009); Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United
States: Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183
(2003).
10
See generally William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L.
REV. 959 (2016); Paul M. Schwarz, The E.U.-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013).
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policymaking pre-eminence as an end in itself.11 This
(unfortunately quite predictable) impulse impedes the emergence
of a privacy regime that exploits the benefits of institutional
diversity and experimentation while also achieving needed levels
of coherence.
The second adverse consequence involves the capacity of the
United States to effectively participate in the formulation of global
privacy standards. Our domestic institutional weaknesses hinder
efforts by the U.S. government to encourage the development of
superior international privacy standards and to achieve needed
levels of cross-border cooperation in law enforcement.12 At
present, the European Union is the dominant influence in setting
privacy standards that govern behavior by firms engaged in transAtlantic trade and, to a significant degree, in global commerce.13
The General Data Protection Regulation, which took effect in May
2018, is simply the latest manifestation of the EU’s preeminent
role in setting international policy standards.14 In pressing ahead
with their own reforms, officials within the European Commission
and the EU’s member state data protection authorities often take a

11

Most readers will be shocked to discover that this is going on. See CASABLANCA
(Warner Bros. Productions 1942) (“I’m shocked—shocked—to find that gambling is
going on in here.”).
12
See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2271 (noting that a “more centralized and
comprehensive approach to data protection is sorely needed in the United States, which is
increasingly at odds with most other countries in the world with its more fragmented
sectoral approach to data protection.”). Hartzog and Solove describe U.S. privacy law as
“a fragmented mess of overlapping and inconsistent laws that make it nearly impossible
for consumers to figure out how their privacy is protected.” Id. at 2273. This situation
weakens the “soft power” that the U.S. government would otherwise have in this policy
space. See id.
13
See Sheera Frenkel, Tech Giants Brace for Europe’s New Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/technology/europe-data-privacyrules.html [https://perma.cc/4UXC-H8DT] (describing the European Union’s influence
over information technology companies operating in Europe and in the United States).
14
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2018 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulation), 2018 O.J. (L. 119) 66. See generally Ozan Karaduman, The
General Data Protection Regulation: Achieving Compliance for EU and Non-EU
Companies, 18 BUS. L. INT’L 225 (2017) (describing the General Data Protection
Regulation).
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dismissive approach to the U.S. privacy regime, and discount U.S.
preferences regarding the optimal structure of privacy rules.15
The dismissive attitude of EU officials toward the U.S. partly
derives from the EU’s hope that it will be accepted as the world’s
foremost privacy regulator. One of us (Kovacic) has participated in
many events in which European privacy officials lament the
weakness of the U.S. system and assert that the U.S. regime is
toothless. Recitals about the U.S. enforcement record—including
cases prosecuted and fines collected—comes as a surprise, and
occasionally seems to inspire a reconsideration of the inadequacy
narrative. But come the next international meeting, and many of
the same European officials will repeat the inadequacy narrative,
and assert that the U.S. privacy regime is a paper tiger. Given these
dynamics, it is not entirely clear how we should go about getting
EU officials to take U.S. privacy regulation seriously, short of a
complete transplant of the E.U. system (including its definition of
privacy as a fundamental human right).
That said, one obvious strategy is for the U.S. to address the
fragmented and convoluted framework of its domestic regulation
of privacy. Foreign officials are understandably perplexed by the
mélange of federal and state institutions—compounded by the
patchwork of sector specific controls and the absence of any
hierarchy of authority that would give one institution the “last
word” on policy formation. We have seen the exasperation of
foreign officials who fruitlessly seek clarity about who is in
charge.
This state of affairs undermines U.S. efforts to shape the
framework of global privacy standards. Until we improve policy
coordination and establish a clear line of authority and
responsibility, the U.S. will witness a further decline in its capacity
to shape global privacy policy—which, at least in the technology
sector, is arguably the single most important form of economic
regulation currently in play. In sum, we believe reform of the

15

The basis for this observation consists of conversations that one of us (Kovacic) has
had with EU officials during his tenure as an FTC Commissioner (2006–11) and in
subsequent meetings as a non-executive director of the United Kingdom’s Competition
and Markets Authority from 2013 to the present.
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existing institutional arrangements are a necessary component if
we want to improve substantive privacy policy—both at home, and
in the effective participation of the U.S. in the formulation of
global privacy standards.
In previous work, we explore the design of competition
agencies and other regulatory bodies.16 We draw upon this work to
consider the future of privacy policy implementation in the U.S. To
focus our discussion of institutional options, we assume that the
U.S. will eventually undertake a fundamental retooling of
substantive privacy policy—which seems likely to take the form of
an omnibus privacy law that consolidates, restates, and extends
existing federal privacy commands. But, as policymakers devise an
omnibus privacy law, they should also simultaneously adjust the
institutional arrangements through which the new substantive
privacy framework will be administered. Indeed, even if an
omnibus privacy statute is not adopted, there is considerable value
in upgrading the mechanism for implementing and extending
existing privacy mandates.17
We begin by describing the array of policy functions that fit
under the privacy umbrella and identifying some of the principal
public institutions that carry out these functions. We then set out
seven criteria for judging the performance of the entities
implementing U.S. privacy policy and for determining the optimal
allocation of tasks to implementing institutions. We use this
framework to propose several ways in which the U.S. should retool
policy development and law enforcement in the privacy space. We
present several options that will increase the coherence and
effectiveness of the U.S. privacy system and enhance the influence
of the U.S. in the development of international privacy policy. We
focus chiefly on whether the FTC, with an enhanced mandate,

16

See generally David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What
Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446
(2014); Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6.
17
See, e.g., Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2271 (noting that the “chances of
Congress passing a comprehensive federal data protection law are remote. The most
practical way that the U.S. data protection regime will evolve into something more
coherent and comprehensive is through FTC enforcement.”)
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should serve as the national privacy regulator, or whether a new
dedicated privacy regulator should be created.
We conclude that the optimal strategy is to enhance the FTC’s
role, by eliminating gaps in its jurisdiction and expanding its
capacity to promote cooperation among agencies with privacy
portfolios. We expect that these steps will help rationalize privacy
policy enforcement and encourage convergence on superior policy
norms.
Our proposal for an enlarged FTC role focuses on two
dimensions of privacy regulation. The first is what might be called
the “consumer-facing” elements of a privacy. Our analysis deals
mainly with the relationship between consumers and enterprises
(for-profit firms and not-for-profit institutions, such as universities)
that provide them with goods and services. The second dimension
involves the privacy of individuals as employees. Here we are
concerned with laws and regulations that control what information
employers can collect about their employees, and how such
information can be distributed within the organization and shared
with other bodies.18
We do not address the legal mechanisms that protect privacy
where the actors are government institutions. Thus, we do not
examine the appropriate framework for devising and implementing
policies that govern data collection and record-keeping
responsibilities of federal agencies.19 We also do not address
privacy questions that arise when government agencies conduct
surveillance for national security purposes. We set aside these
issues for another day, and we recognize there will be a continued,
significant role for privacy policy makers in governmental entities
other than the FTC. Thus, our suggestions for an expanded FTC
18
In discussions with foreign governments about the EU-US Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, the FTC has taken the position that Section five of the FTC Act permits the
agency to control transfers of data involving employees. This position is not easily
reconciled with traditional interpretations that view the FTC Act as protecting the
interests of individuals as consumers. See Hoofnagle, supra note 8, at 321–25 (describing
the operation of the Safe Harbor mechanism). See Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and
Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUSTON L. REV. 719, 738–46 (2001) (describing the
soundness of the FTC’s authority to enforce the Safe Harbor commitments).
19
At the federal level, the modern statutory foundation for privacy requirements that
govern federal agencies is the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
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role with respect to consumer-facing privacy matters would leave
in place the framework of controls that address other privacy
concerns. Nonetheless, our proposal does contemplate stronger
mechanisms to ensure policy consultation and coordination among
governmental entities with privacy mandates—whether consumerfacing or not.
In addressing these issues, we generally do not take on the
substance of U.S. privacy law. Our emphasis upon the benefits of
system-wide coherence and effectiveness applies without regard to
the specific privacy directives that our nation chooses to adopt.
Thus, we do not address the debate over whether the conceptual
foundation for privacy protection should be fair information
practice principles (“FIPPs”),20 a consequences-based theory of
liability,21 or some amalgam or these or other approaches. Of
course, our views do reflect a judgment about which considerations
ought to be taken into account in formulating substantive
requirements. To the extent readers have different views or
priorities, they may well reach different conclusions than we do
about the optimal design of implementing institutions. Stated
differently, your mileage (and preferred vehicle for getting to the
destination) may vary.
I. U.S. PRIVACY POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
Privacy law in the United States is a stark example of a
“regulatory thicket.”22 We focus on two aspects of the regulatory
thicket: the collection of substantive commands that fall within the

20

See Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, COMMERCIAL DATA
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK
3–5, 23–30 (Dec. 2010) (describing FIPPs); see also COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING
PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
101–11 (1992) (describing “core fair information principles”); GELLMAN, supra note 4, at
23.
21
See J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 118–120 (2008) (presenting
privacy policy approach based on proof of adverse consequences to consumers).
22
See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1674, 1696–97 (2016) (applying the concept of a
“regulatory thicket” to describe public regulation of software).
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ambit of privacy regulation and the myriad public institutions
responsible for formulating and implementing privacy policy.
A. Privacy Law Commands: Functions and Forms
Privacy laws in the United States perform two basic functions.
One set of controls seeks to restrict the collection and use of
information about individuals.23 For commercial transactions,
these controls define the circumstances under which service
providers can (a) collect information about their customers; (b)
retain and use such information; and (c) transfer customer
information to third parties.24 Another set of controls establishes
the conditions under which bodies such as credit rating services
can assemble and use data on consumers.25
A second core function is to ensure that information about
consumers is adequately protected from unauthorized use.26 Some
privacy laws require commercial bodies to establish safeguards
against inadvertent disclosure of consumer information.27 Others
punish those who misappropriate consumer information to steal an
individual’s identify or property or damage an individual’s
reputation.28 A further category of controls prohibits unauthorized
access to data systems for the purpose of stealing sensitive data or
disabling a data network.29

23

See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491–547
(2006) (examining controls on the collection and use of information as elements of
privacy policy).
24
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 39–54
(2015) (describing the framework of controls).
25
See generally HOOFNAGLE, supra note 8, at 268–305 (discussing legislation and
controls that have impacted financial data privacy).
26
See id. at 216–35 (discussing the FTC’s standards for information security).
27
See generally American Bar Association, Antitrust Law, in CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 138–39 (2009) (describing legal obligations that require firms to
safeguard consumer information).
28
See generally Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1246 (2003) (providing a review of protections against
identity theft).
29
See generally Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561 (2010) (describing laws governing unauthorized
access to computer databases).
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A complex “jumble” of federal and state statutes seek to
perform these functions.30 Unlike a number of other countries, the
United States has no omnibus federal privacy law.31 Federal
privacy law is a mosaic of controls that apply to specific categories
of activity; to specific sectors; and to specific classes of
individuals.32 The most scalable element of the federal privacy
regime—the prohibition in the Federal Trade Commission Act
against “unfair or deceptive acts and practices” (UDAP)33—is
circumscribed by jurisdictional exclusions involving banks,
common carriers, and not-for-profit institutions.34 Nor does the
FTC have responsibility to oversee data collection and protection
by public institutions; a separate body of laws governs the duties of
public agencies.35 Finally, many elements of federal privacy law
are enforceable with civil remedies only; other laws involving
practices such as identity theft and hacking of computer systems
are punishable as criminal offenses.36
State law and policy provide a major second dimension in U.S.
privacy law.37 The contributions of states, in many respects, equal
or surpass the work of federal institutions in determining the
privacy obligations of commercial actors. One impressive
illustration of the significance of state policy making is the field of
30

Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2267.
Id.
32
Id.
33
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
34
The scope of these exemptions is a regularly litigated matter. See generally F.T.C. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016) (interpreting scope of common
carrier exemption). There are also frequently-expressed concerns about the FTC’s
authority to act to protect the interests of foreign citizens and thus to provide assurance to
other jurisdictions (notably, the European Union) that their citizens are adequately
protected when data about them is transferred to the United States. See Gellman, supra
note 9, at 1213–14.
35
See ALAN CHARLES RAUL, PRIVACY AND THE DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC
INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 23–31 (2002) (describing the Privacy Act and
other controls on the collection and use of information by public bodies).
36
See generally Stuart F. H. Allison et al., Exploring the Crime of Identity Theft:
Prevalence, Clearance Rates, and Victim/Offender Characteristics, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 19
(2005) (discussing the civil and criminal regimes for the prosecution of identity theft). On
the criminal sanctions for unauthorized access to computer databases, see generally Kerr,
supra note 29.
37
See generally Citron, supra note 9 (providing a comprehensive examination of the
role of state law and policy in privacy).
31
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data breach and notification legislation. At least forty-five states
have enacted laws that require firms to notify individuals when an
unauthorized disclosure of consumer information has taken place.38
In this and other areas of privacy policy, state governments
have played an important role in devising and testing various forms
of privacy controls. For example, any listing of the most important
sources of privacy law in the United States would have to include
the State of California.39 Measured by its power to shape national
privacy norms, California deserves a place in any discussion of
which institution determines privacy policy in the United States. If
policymaking significance were the only criterion for selection
(putting aside matters of protocols governing international
relations), California might well be included (along with the FTC
or other federal bodies) in the delegation that represents the United
States in international gatherings of privacy officials.40
B. The Ecology of U.S. Privacy Institutions
An elaborate array of public bodies is responsible for
formulating and implementing privacy policy. Institutional
multiplicity, with concurrent or overlapping grants of authority, is
a routine feature of the U.S. system.41 But privacy law is an
especially interesting case, due to the exceptional variety of public
institutions that occupy some part of the policymaking and law
enforcement space.42 Privacy stands out for study not just because
of the complexity of the U.S. system considered in isolation, but

38

See Gregory James Evans, Regulating Data Practices: How State Laws Can Shore
Up the FTC’s Authority to Regulate Data Breaches, Privacy, and More, 67 ADMIN. L.
REV. 187, 203, 203 n.93 (2015).
39
On California’s central role as a privacy regulator, see Citron, supra note 9, at 762.
40
Indeed, one could reasonably argue that California has an active foreign policy
portfolio—and not just on privacy. See David Freeman Engstrom & Jeremy M.
Weinstein, What if California Had A Foreign Policy? The New Frontier of States’ Rights,
41 WASH. Q. 27 (2018) (“[Governor Jerry] “Brown eagerly positioned California at the
forefront of global efforts to confront climate change. . . Because California prides itself
on its global reach, the idea of a distinctively Californian foreign policy has been kicking
around for a while.”)
41
See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6, at 9.
42
For a discussion of the complexity of the regulatory framework for privacy policy in
the United States, see supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.

1130

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:1117

also by comparison to many foreign privacy regimes, which use far
fewer institutions to implement substantive privacy law.
Below, we sketch out the regulatory ecosystem for the
implementation of domestic privacy policy. We use the term
“ecosystem” to capture several distinctive features of the U.S.
One element is the extraordinary diversity of
regime.43
institutional species/entities. A large number of these institutions
have developed programs and processes for devising privacy
policy and enforcing privacy legal commands.44 A careful
understanding of what each institution does, and knowledge of
how it evolved, should precede decisions to uproot individual
species, or to introduce new species into the ecosystem.
A second element of the privacy ecosystem is a relatively rapid
adaptability that flourishes through a process of decentralized
decision making and does not depend on central direction as a
predicate for policy development. Despite the lack of an omnibus
privacy law, institutions at the national and state levels have
adjusted over time to the emergence of new commercial
phenomena and to rapid technological change.45
The myriad of privacy institutions are in key respects,
interdependent. The effectiveness of the entire system of privacy
controls depends on how well each institution accounts for these
interdependencies. Through formal and informal means, the public
agency participants in privacy regulation have formed mechanisms
to coordinate their operations. Imperfect though it is, coordination
has facilitated the development of common principles, and has
reduced the smash-ups that one might expect from a multi-level
43

See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (describing the “regulatory
ecosystem” of the federal government). In fairness, our ecosystem metaphor obscures the
degree of “intelligent design” in the system, as well as the extent to which dumb luck
plays a role. See, e.g., SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1783–1917, at 413 (1927) (“Prince Bismarck is said to have remarked, just before
his death, that there was a special providence for drunkards, fools, and the United States
of America.”).
44
See supra notes 23–28 (describing the “regulatory ecosystem” of the federal
government).
45
See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Charting the Course: The Federal Trade Commission’s
Second Hundred Years, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2101, 2102–11 (2015) (describing the
modern evolution of FTC’s role in developing privacy policy standards).
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regulatory regime with so many actors. Decisions about the
redesign of institutions—such as by uprooting one regulator’s
duties and assigning them to another—should account for the
operation and effectiveness of networks and policy synapses that
may not be readily visible.
Federal agencies. The most important federal privacy
institution is the FTC, which has become the leading U.S. privacy
body.46 At present, the FTC is responsible for three distinct policy
fields: competition, consumer protection, and privacy (which is
situated within the agency’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, but
has acquired its own identity and prominence).47 The
Commission’s privacy work is grounded partly in laws that, in
whole or in part, are specifically designed as privacy measures.
These include early measures, such as the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”)48 and more recent enactments such as the GrammLeach-Bliley Act49 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act (“COPPA”).50 The FTC has built an extensive “common law”
of privacy protection through settlements in cases brought pursuant
to its UDAP mandate.51
Most privacy scholars regard this process of common law
elaboration as a useful approach,52 but this view is not universally
accepted.53 The FTC has also used its rulemaking authority to
46

See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 8, at 192 (“The Federal Trade Commission has
emerged as the nation’s top regulator of privacy.”); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at
2267 (“In the current U.S. privacy regulatory system, the FTC has grown into the role of
being the leading regulator of privacy . . .”).
47
For a discussion on the ascent of privacy as a distinct focus of FTC policymaking
and on the possibilities for future elaboration of the Commission’s role in this field, see
Hoofnagle, supra note 8; Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3; Vladeck, supra note 44, at
2102–11
48
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
49
15 U.S.C. §§ 6804–05 (2012).
50
15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2012).
51
The FTC is not alone in using the administrative process to build legal norms. See
Justin Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955,
958 (2016).
52
Positive assessments include Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, and HOOFNAGLE,
supra note 8.
53
For a negative assessment of the FTC’s contributions to privacy policy, see Robert
Gellman, Can Consumers Trust the FTC to Protect Their Privacy?, ACLU (Oct. 25,
2016), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/can-consumers-trust-ftc-protect-their-privacy
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build important elements of the national privacy architecture,
including the Do-Not-Call rule, which was promulgated pursuant
to the Telemarketing Sales Act.
Some critics view the FTC’s privacy program as a barrier to
the adoption of an improved privacy regime. One of us (Kovacic)
attended a privacy conference as an FTC official, and was
approached by a privacy advocate who condemned the FTC and its
use of UDAP authority to address privacy issues. The advocate
argued that the FTC’s UDAP cases had created the illusion of
effective law enforcement and had given the business community a
useful argument to blunt demands for legislation that would
dramatically upgrade the U.S. privacy framework. Only if the FTC
stood down, he said, would the serious inadequacies of the status
quo be revealed, and the necessary support for needed reforms
materialize.
The FTC also has important “soft power” tools with which to
set privacy policy.54 The FTC can examine industry trends by
compelling companies to provide information. The FTC can also
conduct studies, hold hearings, and prepare reports—a power it has
used to examine privacy-related matters.55 The FTC has also
played a major role as a convener of conferences, workshops, and
seminars that have served to identify significant commercial trends
and focus debate on key privacy issues.56
[https://perma.cc/UNV9-EGU9] (“[T]he FTC deserves low grades when it comes to
protecting consumer privacy.”).
54
See Adam D. Thierer, Ryan Hagemann, and Jennifer Skees, Soft Law for Hard
Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, COLO.
TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2019); see also William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband
Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building the Competition and Consumer
Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 2–3 (2010).
55
See, e.g., Protecting Consumer Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/ftcprivacy-report [https://perma.cc/4QHA-6SLC] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019); see also Edith
Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Privacy in the Era of Big Data,
Remarks at the International Conference on Big Data from a Privacy Perspective (Hong
Kong, June 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/06/protectingprivacy-era-big-data-remarks-ftc-chairwoman-edith-ramirez
[https://perma.cc/3E438SXK].
56
See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Agenda for
PrivacyCon (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/
ftc-announces-agenda-privacycon [https://perma.cc/U6ZQ-CV32]. On the FTC’s role in
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As noted above, the FTC’s capacity to serve as the U.S.
privacy regulator is hampered by several jurisdictional carve-outs.
In 1914, Congress largely exempted banks, common carriers, and
not-for-profit institutions from the FTC’s oversight.57 The
exempted sectors assemble, use, and transmit massive amounts of
data about individuals, yet they stand beyond the FTC’s reach. It is
difficult to envision the FTC serving as a truly effective national
regulator of the consumer-facing elements of privacy policy if
these exemptions persist.
A variety of sectoral regulators occupy some of the policy
terrain left open by the FTC’s jurisdictional exclusions. A notable
example is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
which exercises privacy oversight for telecommunications
providers.58 The boundary between what is (and is not) a
telecommunications service has shifted over time—and has moved
dramatically in recent years, in the face of technological change,
court decisions, and the FCC’s adoption (2016) and revocation
(2017) of the “net neutrality” rule.59 By classifying broadband as a
telecommunications service (bringing it within the ambit of the
common carrier exemption), the FCC’s net neutrality rule would
have ousted the FTC from privacy oversight in this technological
space. The revocation of the net neutrality rule preserved the
FTC’s role in this policy space.
The FCC is not the only federal agency with sector-specific
privacy oversight. The Department of Education enforces the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),60 which
imposes record-disclosure duties and limits on educational
institutions and state educational bodies that receive federal funds.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) plays the
convening events that provide fora for academics, advocacy groups, government
officials, and practitioners to discuss privacy and other policy issues, see generally
William E. Kovacic, The FTC as Convenor: Developing Regulatory Policy Norms
without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17 (2015).
57
These jurisdictional limitations are described in Antitrust Law Developments,
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, 658–59 (7th ed. 2012).
58
See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 8, at 335–37 (describing FCC’s role in privacy
regulation).
59
Ohm & Reid, supra note 22, at 1674–75, 1697–98.
60
20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012).
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lead role in enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA),61 which established data privacy
obligations and security requirements to safeguard medical
information.
Another notable participant in federal privacy policy
implementation is the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The
Department is responsible for enforcing a collection of criminal
statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,62 which fall
within the general heading of cybersecurity.63 DOJ also has the
power to enforce general anti-fraud provisions (e.g., statutes
involving mail fraud and wire fraud) that can be used to attack
such cyber-crimes as hacking and identify theft.64
Consistent with our regulatory ecosystem theme, there have
been numerous efforts to coordinate the work of these entities, in
order to develop national privacy policy objectives and work with
foreign governments to establish international policy norms. The
FTC, the Department of Commerce, and various ad hoc bodies
established by the Office of the President have all contributed to
this broader policy development and coordination process.
Finally, we note that our focus on consumer-facing privacy
obscures the reality that multiple public entities collect information
on citizens and residents of the U.S. Although we have already
described the FTC as the “closest U.S. equivalent to a national
privacy authority,” the FTC does not have the statutory authority to
oversee the privacy practices of executive branch departments and
agencies—and any attempt to give it that power would raise
61

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2018).
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 2,100 Stat. 1213-16
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
63
See Patricia Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1443 (2016); see
generally Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statues, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003). The expanding significance
of this area of enforcement is addressed in Why Everything is Hackable, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 8, 2017, at 73.
64
For example, DOJ plays a significant role in prosecuting instances of identity theft.
See Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan, PRESIDENT’S IDENTITY THEFT TASK
FORCE
52–71
(2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports
/combating-identity-theft-strategic-plan/strategicplan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WUJ4WXY6].
62
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serious constitutional issues. Currently, many of these
departments—including the Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security—have their own privacy
offices.65
State and Local Governments. State governments are
prominent sources of U.S. privacy law.66 The states typically
enforce their own laws through privacy units contained within the
office of the state attorney general.67 Some enforcement functions
are performed at the municipal level.68 In many instances, local
police departments are the focal point for reports about identity
theft, although they usually lack the authority or information
sharing mechanisms to pursue these matters effectively.69
Non-Government
Organizations.
Non-government
organizations (NGOs) also play an important role in the creation of
norms and in policy coordination. Academic institutions and
professional societies (such as the American Association of
Privacy Professionals) provide networks in which the full spectrum
of groups with an interest in privacy policy (e.g., academics,
companies, consumer advocates, consultancies, government
officials, legislators and their staff members, and practitioners)
meet to discuss privacy policy issues.
Such meetings can help build consensus about the content and
implementation of privacy policy. For this reason, NGOs are an
important ingredient in the creation of privacy norms. These
organizations also provide a forum in which policymakers can
meet each other and discuss matters of common concern. These
engagements supplement the more formal arrangements through
65

See,
e.g.,
Privacy,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF.,
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/privacy [https://perma.cc/XR3S-H47M] (last visited Feb. 12,
2019); Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opcl
[https://perma.cc/5YNH-AQLU] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
66
See generally Citron, supra note 9 (comprehensively examining the framework of
state controls).
67
See generally id. (describing such mechanisms).
68
See generally id.
69
See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 40–41
(describing measures to enhance cooperation across federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies to share information about instances of identity theft and to
facilitate prosecution).
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which public officials discuss shared or collateral responsibilities.
The academic institutions and professional societies also function
as educational hubs through which the U.S. privacy community
and its foreign counterparts meet to learn about international
developments. In combination, these interactions help crystallize
shared understandings about the substance and process of privacy
norms that can inform the development of international standards.
II. U.S. PRIVACY LAW IMPLEMENTATION INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN:
SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES
We approach the question of institutional design for privacy
policy implementation from two perspectives. First, what
considerations should guide the design of the system as a whole?
Second, what criteria should inform the allocation of tasks to
specific institutions within the larger system framework?
A. System-wide Design Criteria
U.S. privacy policy implementation should satisfy five basic
criteria: policy coherence, well-defined lines of authority, costminimization, adaptability, and diversification.
Policy Coherence. The implementation framework should
foster the development of clear and consistent commands. Affected
operators should not to have to reconcile conflicting obligations
with respect to the same activity. Similarly situated operators
should be subject to the same obligations. Industry-specific
variations should be justified by the distinctive needs of the sector.
And individual regulators should be attuned to the spillover effects
of their own decisions upon other regulators and other industries.
Well-Defined Lines of Authority. Affected operators, citizens,
and foreign data protection officials should have a clear view of
the responsibilities of each implementation institution.
Cost-Minimization. Regulatory objectives should be achieved
at the lowest possible cost to operators and citizens—meaning that
needless institutional complexity should be avoided.
Adaptability. The regulatory system should be designed so it
can adapt to changing conditions, including the ability to address
new phenomena and technological developments. To do so, the
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system should have the resources and policy tools to stay abreast
of new developments and reasonably elastic mandates—for
example, by rulemaking—to adjust legal commands over time.70
Diversification. Overlapping or parallel authority can serve as a
useful safeguard against failure by any single institution and can
facilitate policy experimentation that produces good solutions to
new problems.71
We note that tensions inevitably arise among these goals. For
example, the diversification that can promote useful
experimentation and adaptability can come at the cost of systemwide coherence (more regulators taking different approaches to
solving the same problem) and greater administrative costs. The
purpose of focusing on these criteria is to recognize design
tradeoffs and identify areas for possible improvement.
B. Allocation of Regulatory Tasks
Based on our prior work, we offer seven criteria that should
guide the assignment of regulatory responsibility to governmental
agencies.72
Policy Coherence. At the agency level, one must ask whether a
privacy mandate fits within the agency’s existing portfolio of
duties. The issue is relatively simple when privacy is the agency’s
only responsibility—but that really does not apply to our current
regulatory framework. The key participants in privacy regulation—
the DOJ, the FCC, the FTC, and state attorneys general—all have
diversified mandates. The wisdom of placing privacy within a
multi-function agency—or giving a privacy role to an agency that
presently does something else—depends principally on whether
privacy and the other functions are policy complements rather than
policy substitutes.73

70

See Ric Simmons, The Failure of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Time to Take
an Administrative Approach to Regulating Computer Crime, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1703, 1714–22 (2016) (discussing how administrative agencies can use rulemaking and
other policy tools to adapt to changing conditions).
71
See generally Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6.
72
See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1468–83.
73
See id.
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Branding and Credibility. Agencies develop reputations or
“brands” that convey information about their aims and
effectiveness. A good brand is an asset when the agency appears
before other governmental bodies (e.g., courts or legislatures),
deals with affected operators, or interacts with foreign authorities.
The assignment of unrelated functions to an agency can diminish
its brand, even if the functions are not policy substitutes. Excessive
diversification can reduce the agency’s ability to define its role
clearly and to build a reputation for competence and effectiveness.
Capability and Capacity. Capability refers to whether the
agency has the statutory powers, organizational structure, and
processes to perform its assigned role effectively. Capacity focuses
on whether the agency has the resources—human capital and
physical infrastructure—to fulfill its responsibilities. Legislators
routinely give regulators too little power and too few resources to
meet the goals set out in the law. Some degree of mismatch
between ends and means is inevitable, but serious imbalances will
cause policy failures.
Adaptability. Regulators must be able to adapt to technological
development and other unforeseen circumstances. In many
respects, adaptability is a function of the agency’s capability (grant
of authority) and its capacity (human and physical resources).
Internal Cohesion. A major determinant of agency
effectiveness is the successful integration of its internal operating
units.74 For a single-purpose agency with law enforcement duties,
this requires joining up the work of case-handling teams, the
general counsel’s office, and other relevant operating units. For a
body with a multi-member governance system, the attainment of
internal cohesion also involves the formulation, to the greatest
extent possible, of a common vision on the part of board members
and the development of techniques for communicating that vision
inside and outside the agency. For a multi-function agency,
74

See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429
(2015). See also Bijal Shah, Toward an Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 101 (2017); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals:
An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2017);
Daniel Carpenter, Internal Governance of Agencies: The Sieve, the Shove, the Show, 129
HARV. L. REV. F. 189, 192 (2016).

2019]

IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY POLICY

1139

internal cohesion requires mechanisms to ensure that conceptual
policy synergies are realized in practice.
Relationship to the Larger Regulatory Ecosystem. In many
settings, two or more public agencies exercise the same or related
policy making duties or law enforcement functions.75 The
assignment of concurrent or parallel authority to two or more
institutions is usually a source of tension, as the relevant agencies
understandably regard one another as rivals rather than partners.
Despite antagonisms, agencies recognize the need for
cooperation and develop a range of mechanisms, some formal
(e.g., the execution of an interagency memorandum of
understanding) and some informal (e.g., regular discussions among
agency leaders and case-handlers), to achieve policy coherence
across the system and reduce conflict. Decisions about whether to
move policy functions from one agency to another, or to situate
new duties in an existing agency, should be undertaken with
awareness of these policy synapses.
Political Support. The effectiveness of a design for a single
institution requires that the design be politically sustainable. Does
the agency’s substantive mandate and organization enable it to
gain the assent of elected officials (e.g., in the form of adequate
appropriations) for the successful performance of its duties? The
decision in Dodd-Frank to insulate the new Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) so extensively from political
interference reflected the belief that only a truly autonomous
regulator would take bold action to avoid another collapse of the
financial system.76 Yet the full collection of safeguards—notably
governance by a single director appointed for a fixed term and
funding through fees collected by the Federal Reserve Board—has
exposed the new institution to assault in the courts and in Congress
about whether it has the necessary degree of accountability.77
75

See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1454–60 (collecting examples of shared
policymaking functions).
76
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Financial Service Industry’s Misguided Quest to
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881,
884 (2012).
77
See generally PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). See also
Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1504–08.
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If political support for an agency is absent entirely, or exists
but only on a partisan basis, there will be concrete consequences
for the perceived legitimacy of the agency. It is not an accident that
President Trump named an individual to head the CFPB (OMB
Director Mick Mulvaney) who had previously stated that the
agency was a “joke, in a sick, sad kind of way” and had cosponsored legislation that would have eliminated the CFPB.78 Nor
was it an accident that the CFPB was the only agency in the federal
government at which there was a lawsuit over who was actually in
charge of the bureau—with the (ultimately unsuccessful) claims to
the throne by Leandra English, the just-named Deputy Director of
the CFPB, enthusiastically backed by Congressional Democrats,
and dismissed or ignored by Republicans.79
III. APPLYING OUR CRITERIA: WHO SHOULD DO WHAT?
Any overhaul of substantive privacy policy should be
accompanied by a reexamination of the framework of
implementing institutions. Even if we do not overhaul substantive
privacy policy, it is past time for the institutional arrangements
through which privacy policy is developed and administered to be
overhauled as well. Measured by the criteria set out in Section III,
the U.S. regime for implementing privacy policy has serious
weaknesses. Perhaps the most noteworthy weakness is a lack of
coherence. The heavy reliance on an accumulation of sectorspecific and activity-specific statutory measures has established a
mosaic that contains potent controls but lacks unifying principles
and has important gaps. The FTC has used its UDAP authority to
78

See Abigail Tracy, What the Hell is Going on at the CFPB?, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 27,
2017),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/donald-trump-mick-mulvaneyconsumer-finance-protection-bureau [https://perma.cc/L5FE-3E7F]; Gillian B. White,
The Dismal Future of Trump’s Least Favorite Agency, ATLANTIC (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/cfpb-mulvaney-trump/546131/
[https://perma.cc/8G57-VWR2].
79
Tracy, supra note 77. See also Doyle McManus, It’s High Noon at the CFPB, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-cfpbelizabeth-warren-trump-20171129-story.html [https://perma.cc/6KZ6-2SS2]; Kelsey
Tamborrino, Graham, Durbin Disagree on New CFPB Director, POLITICO (Nov. 26,
2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/26/graham-durbin-consumer-protectionagency-259969 [https://perma.cc/L7WF-73VN].
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fill some of the gaps, but the agency’s jurisdictional limitations are
a serious disability. Coherence also suffers from the ability of
individual regulators—state and federal—to establish new
interpretations or requirements without the need to coordinate their
choices with other regulators or to consider the impact of new
initiatives on the larger ecosystem of privacy regulation.
The fragmentation of responsibility for domestic privacy policy
also denies the U.S. coherence and credibility in the eyes of its
foreign counterparts. In our experience, some foreign privacy
regulators downgrade the U.S. privacy regime on substantive
grounds, often pointing to the lack of an omnibus statutory
foundation with universal applicability. Others score the U.S.
system poorly for the absence of a simplified implementation
framework overseen by a single national privacy regulator. Most
foreign privacy regulators have doubts about the benefits of
simultaneous federal and state-level enforcement in the absence of
clearly delegated lines of authority. Simplification of the U.S.
privacy regime, anchored by the establishment of a national
privacy regulator and clarification of zones of authority among the
various regulators, would give the U.S. more influence in global
privacy policymaking.80
What might such a simplified, clarified framework look like?
There are a number of possible approaches for ordering the
relationship of public agencies in policy domains occupied by
multiple authorities.81 For the national privacy authority, we focus
on two distinct options. One approach is to enhance the powers of
the Federal Trade Commission, which, as noted above, is the
closest equivalent to a U.S. national privacy agency.82 The other
approach is to create a new free-standing national privacy agency.
We consider each of these strategies in turn.
80

See Gellman, supra note 9, at 1187 (“[W]ith the international critical mass of data
protection agencies that now exists, a country without an agency is at a disadvantage.”).
81
See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D:
A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government, 51 HARV. J. LEGIS. 19, 21
(2014).
82
See supra text accompanying note 8. See also Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at
2294–300; Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 4, at 368–82 (proposing that the FTC, using
its existing grants of authority, could expand its role in developing coherent nationwide
privacy standards).
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A. Enhanced FTC as National Privacy Regulator
Under the first option, Congress would eliminate the FTC’s
jurisdictional limitations and give it the authority to enforce
privacy across the board—including against not-for-profit
institutions. Other government agencies (e.g., the Department of
Health and Human Services) would retain concurrent powers to
enforce privacy laws, but only pursuant to rules and other guidance
set by the FTC, and under a regular process of consultation
involving the FTC and its federal counterparts. Such a concurrency
regime could be modeled along the lines of the United Kingdom’s
competition policy framework by which the Competition and
Markets Authority (CMA) and sectoral regulators such as OFGEN
and OFCOM share authority for the enforcement of the nation’s
competition laws. The CMA and the sectoral regulators engage in
regular consultations through the United Kingdom Competition
Network (UKCN), which serves to coordinate competition policy
implementation and ensure cooperation in the application of the
CMA’s law enforcement and other policymaking tools.
The case for making an enhanced FTC the national privacy
regulator is straightforward. Of all U.S. privacy implementation
institutions, the FTC has unequaled capacity in the form of expert
case handling and policy teams and physical resources (including
the development, over the past decade, of an internet laboratory to
do high-quality forensic work, and the hiring of technology experts
to assist in that effort). The agency’s capacity also is the product of
extensive experience in applying its UDAP authority and enforcing
statutes such as the FCRA and COPPA. The FTC has a broad
portfolio of policy instruments (litigation, rulemaking, consumer
and business education, data collection, the preparation of reports,
the convening of conferences), and it has demonstrated its ability
to use all of them to good effect in the privacy domain. The FTC’s
stature as an independent agency gives it additional credibility in
the eyes of foreign officials, who generally distrust the vesting of
privacy powers in an executive department.
Within an enhanced FTC, privacy policy implementation also
would be informed by the Commission’s larger experience with
consumer protection. The FTC’s privacy unit is one part of its
Bureau of Consumer Protection, rather than being a self-contained
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bureau. This reflected the institution’s reasonable view that the
effort to safeguard consumer interests in “privacy” was one
dimension of “consumer protection,” rather than a wholly distinct
policy realm. Our impression is that many matters that involve
privacy issues also raise problems that fit within other areas of the
FTC’s consumer protection program. The analysis of the “privacy”
issue often benefits from perspectives developed in the course of
applying the agency’s deception and unfairness authority in other
cases. The intertwining of privacy issues with other consumer
protection concerns in many scenarios has important implications
for how the mandate of a privacy agency should be defined. In
whatever setting one ultimately might place a “privacy” mandate,
we would expect that the host agency would have a mandate that
incorporates powers that traditionally have been associated with
the FTC’s broader consumer protection program.83
The FTC’s expertise in antitrust should also help it develop and
enforce privacy policy. Enforcing antitrust law has given the FTC
ongoing involvement in multiple high-tech markets—as well as an
understanding of how competition can motivate companies to offer
better privacy protections. The FTC’s work in both consumer
protection and antitrust draws upon a Bureau of Economics with
over 80 PhDs in economics.84 The Bureau of Economics has
developed considerable skill in sub-disciplines (including
behavioral economics) with special application to privacy issues.
Of course, inputs are not the same thing as outputs. The FTC
has not always achieved the full integration of perspectives that the
combination of these institutional capacities would permit. And,
although there are policy complementarities across the domains of
antitrust, consumer protection, and privacy, this combination of
functions is not an unmixed blessing. An agency with all three
functions might seek to use its position as a gatekeeper with
respect to one policy domain to leverage concessions from firms
83

The interconnections between the domains of privacy law and consumer protection
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WASH. L. REV. 995, 1043 (2014).
84
See Paul A. Pautler, A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics 136 (Am.
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eighty-two economists with doctorates in economics).
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over which it exercises oversight in another domain.85 Such
temptations have been present when the FTC has applied its
antitrust powers to review mergers involving companies in the
information services sector.86
Finally, there is the possibility that any one of these functions
might be diminished if all three are contained in the same agency.
An agency focused solely on privacy will make privacy policy its
single concern. An agency responsible for antitrust, consumer
protection, and privacy is likely to find itself making tradeoffs as it
sets priorities for how to use its resources.
Giving the FTC an expanded privacy role is likely to prompt
reevaluation of the FTC’s portfolio. More privacy powers (and a
larger privacy budget) would make antitrust a comparatively
smaller element of the FTC’s program. In the FTC’s budget
request to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019, the funds proposed for
consumer protection (including privacy) functions constituted
nearly fifty-four percent of the agency’s budget.87 An expanded
privacy role would reduce the overall percentage of resources
devoted to antitrust policy still further. Any augmentation of the
FTC’s privacy role could well trigger a larger debate about
whether the FTC should retain its antitrust mandate, or instead
divest its antitrust functions to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ.
Similar questions would arise if Congress dissolved the CFPB
and assigned its duties to the FTC. From Fiscal Year 2010 through
Fiscal Year 2017, the FTC’s headcount ranged between 1132 and
1165; the CFPB’s is roughly 1800.88 Even if the FTC absorbed
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(2018), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/fy-2019-congressional-budget-justification [https://
perma.cc/BS6F-25JM].
88
On the FTC’s data, see FTC Appropriation and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE)
History, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureausoffices/office-executive-director/financial-management-office/ftc-appropriation
[https://perma.cc/73DM-QXM4]. The CFPB’s FTE headcount estimate for Fiscal Year
2018 was 1792. See The CFPB Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU
(2017),
Report,
11–12
CONSUMER

2019]

IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY POLICY

1145

only half of the CFPB’s employees, the share of agency resources
dedicated to antitrust would fall to under a third of the agency’s
budget—posing the same question about whether an agency whose
duties are so heavily weighted toward consumer protection should
retain antitrust responsibilities.
If this path is followed, the long-term result of making the FTC
the nation’s top privacy cop may transform the agency into a
consumer protection/privacy regulator, rather than a consumer
protection/antitrust regulator. Reasonable people can disagree on
whether that transformation is a net positive development.
From an international relations perspective, an enhanced FTC
would be a more effective participant in policy discussions and
deliberations on privacy standards. With the jurisdictional
loopholes closed, the FTC could properly claim to speak with
respect to all matters affecting consumer-facing privacy in the U.S.
The FTC’s status as an independent agency also gives it sufficient
distance from the executive branch—avoiding concerns that would
otherwise be inevitable if the U.S. data protection authority were
an executive department.
B. A New National Privacy Regulator
The second option for creating a national privacy regulator
would be for the FTC to spin off its privacy functions to a newly
formed commission, which also might absorb the privacy-related
functions of other federal bodies.89 Compared to a multi-function
agency, an independent, privacy-only commission would have
internal policy cohesion and greater ability to develop a well-

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201705_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budgetand-performance-plan_FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX2T-6W2G].
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understood policy brand.90 It would also be less subject to the pathdependent constraints that would inevitably be associated with
turning all consumer-facing privacy matters over to an enhanced
FTC.
These conditions potentially would improve the agency’s
ability to function effectively within the U.S. and to engage with
foreign authorities, who no longer would have concerns that the
U.S. regulator’s privacy program was diluted by attention to nonprivacy policy duties. This cohesiveness and clarity would come at
the cost of losing connection to relevant experience assembled in
the fulfillment of the FTC’s antitrust and consumer protection
missions. On the other hand, the powers of the new institution
could be defined in a way that enables the agency to address
privacy issues with consumer protection powers akin to those now
exercised by the FTC.
The independent privacy agency also would be untethered from
the discipline provided by the work of the FTC’s Bureau of
Economics, which has pushed the FTC’s antitrust and consumer
protection lawyers to apply economic analysis in the development
of cases and rules. Of course, it would be possible to give the new
privacy agency a similar analytical capacity. As with the FTC, the
actual application of that capability would depend heavily on the
training and preferences of the new agency’s leadership. One
function we would expect the FTC or a new stand-alone privacy
agency to perform is to evaluate the effects of individual privacy
initiatives at the federal and state levels, and periodically to assess
the impact of the U.S. privacy system as a whole.
In setting out this option, we recognize all of the difficulties
that arise in the creation of a new institution that absorbs many of
its functions and personnel from other agencies. No one should
underestimate the lost productivity that occurs during the period of
transition. Nor can one ignore the costs of knitting new functions
and personnel into a new institution. Bringing a variety of
disparate mandates and teams under a single roof does not mean
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that they automatically will function as an integrated whole. These
changes are the equivalent of major surgery, and recovery time for
the new organization can be substantial.
C. Suggested Approach
We suggest the adoption of the first approach set out above: the
FTC should become the principal U.S. data protection authority for
consumer-facing privacy matters. A necessary legislative
foundation for this approach would involve (a) eliminating the
jurisdictional exclusions from the FTC’s mandate, (b) giving the
FTC concurrent enforcement authority with respect to all
consumer-facing federal statutes, and (c) giving the FTC an
express mandate to coordinate national privacy policy.
This approach would not divest other government agencies of
the privacy policy functions they now perform, nor would it
involve the FTC’s absorption of staff now resident in other
government agencies. Other governmental institutions will
continue to have important privacy responsibilities. The DOJ will
retain an important role, prosecuting cybercrimes and other grave
infringements of privacy laws. The Department of Commerce and
the other ad hoc bodies within the Office of the President will
continue to be active in the privacy space, given the prominence of
privacy issues in domestic economic policy, in international trade
negotiations, and in foreign relations generally.91 And, as noted
previously, our proposal only covers consumer-facing privacy
regulation—leaving in place the existing infrastructure for all other
matters.
What about the states? Some commentators have argued that a
full-scale renovation of the U.S. privacy framework should
preempt the ability of states to pursue initiatives inconsistent with
national policy.92 We think an alternative pathway holds greater
promise. Federal and state privacy regulators currently cooperate
in a variety of ways, but there is no systematic mechanism for
policy coordination or convergence on shared norms. We propose
91
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the extension of existing cooperation and coordination efforts
through the establishment of a domestic privacy network (DPN)—
analogous to the International Competition Network for antitrust
enforcers.93 A DPN will help encourage privacy regulators within
the U.S. to converge on superior policy norms.
Among other tasks, the DPN could use the accumulated
experience of state regulators to devise model laws—for example,
a law dealing with data breaches—that will provide focal points for
convergence. Here the DPN would play a role akin to that
performed by American Law Institute and the National Council of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.94
From a theoretical perspective, one can improve the
institutional framework for U.S. privacy policy either by merger
(i.e., by placing all relevant functions within a single institution) or
by contract (i.e., by creating and strengthening the ties that allow
existing entities to better coordinate their efforts). Our
“integration-by-contract” approach involves greater costs of
coordination, but it has several major benefits. Most importantly, it
avoids the disruption that takes place when responsibilities and
personnel are reallocated across agencies. We believe that
reorganizations are difficult to justify unless the benefits are
compelling. As a practical matter, reorganization proposals also
face daunting political headwinds, since they disrupt settled
practices and expectations (including the flow of campaign
contributions to members of Congress).
CONCLUSION
For nearly two decades, a growing collection of commentators
has called for fundamental reform of the U.S. privacy regime.95
Recent developments—including the implementation of the

93

For a discussion of the possible creation of such a network to deal with competition
law, see William E. Kovacic, Toward a Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION
LAWS IN CONFLICT 316–17 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).
94
Cf. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1903 (2013) (using the UCC analogy to discuss the
development and broad adoption of privacy norms).
95
See supra note 4, and accompanying text.

2019]

IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY POLICY

1149

GDPR,96 and disclosures about apparent lapses in data protection
by leading information services firms97—may be creating a
political environment in which Congress undertakes a basic
redesign of U.S. privacy law. Concerns about the adequacy of the
U.S. privacy system have led the leaders of major American high
technology firms to call for adoption of a new omnibus U.S. law
that resembles the GDPR.98
Should these developments catalyze basic change,
improvements in U.S. privacy policy will require as much attention
to implementation as it does to the appropriate content of
substantive privacy standards. Currently, domestic privacy
policymaking and enforcement are fragmented. This state of affairs
precludes policy coherence at home and diminishes the influence
of the U.S. in international deliberations about global privacy
norms.
We offer two options for the development of a next-generation
national privacy regulator: the enhancement of the powers and role
of the FTC or the creation of a new, independent privacy
commission whose core would consist of privacy functions
previously performed by the FTC. In addition, we suggest the
creation of a policy network that links implementation at the
federal and state levels. Although we believe the former solution
(enhanced FTC) is better than the latter solution (new privacy
regulator), either solution would be an improvement on the status
quo.
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